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Are the Japanese to Blame
for Our Trade Deficit?
by Owen F. Humpage
/*.mid charges and countercharges of
unfair competition and trade restrictions
attending the recent U.S.-Japanese trade
dispute, many commentators have lost
sight of important variations in these na-
tions' saving and investment behavior.
These differences ultimately sustain the
large, persistent, mirror-image trade im-
balances of both countries.
Fair and free market access is impor-
tant to producers and consumers in Ja-
pan and the United States alike. Econo-
mists have long acknowledged that
free trade can enhance both nations'
standard of living. But we should real-
ize that policies to pry open Japanese
markets or to deny Japan access to our
markets will have few lasting effects
on either country's overall trade bal-
ance. Trade surpluses and deficits are
proper, sustainable, and mutually bene-
ficial responses to disparate saving and
investment patterns among nations.
• Balance of Payments
The U.S. balance of payments records
all transactions between U.S. residents
and the rest of the world. These fall
into two broad categories: the current
account, which consists mainly of trade
in goods and services, and the capital
account, which includes all types of fi-
nancial transactions. One can inter-
pret current and capital account items
as cross-border claims on existing and
future world output, respectively.
As the name implies, the balance of pay-
ments always balances (see box). Every
international transaction creates both a
debit and a credit entry in the ledger. If,
for example, an American buys a Japa-
nese car and pays for it with a check
drawn against a domestic bank, the bal-
ance of payments records the imported
car as a debit in the trade account and
lists the Japanese claim on the U.S.
bank as a credit in the capital account.
Essentially, we have imported a car and
exported ownership of the deposit.
Should the Japanese use the bank ac-
count to acquire something else, like
U.S. corporate stocks or Treasury secu-
rities, additional offsetting debits and
credits will enter the balance of pay-
ments. Suppose that Japan buys Ameri-
can rice with its claim on the U.S. bank.
The balance of payments will record
the export of rice as a credit item in the
trade account, and the reduction in the
Japanese claim on the U.S. bank as a
debit item in the capital account. Essen-
tially, we have exported rice and reim-
ported ownership of that bank deposit.
Because of the double-entry nature of
the accounts, surpluses or deficits can
exist only in a subset of the transac-
tions. Most often, analysts concentrate
on the current account. Last year, the
United States ran an estimated current
account deficit of $109 billion. A coun-
try that imports more than it exports
must pay for the excess by drawing
down its financial claims on the rest of
the world or by providing financial
claims on itself to the rest of the world.
In doing so last year, the United States
recorded a $109 billion capital account
Despite commonly expressed com-
plaints about the persistent U.S.-
Japanese trade imbalance, restricting
Japan's access to our markets will
not erase the trade deficit or surplus
of either nation. Instead, trade imbal-
ances are sustainable, beneficial, and
proper reflections of domestic saving
and investment decisions.
surplus or, in economists' terms, a
$109 billion inflow of foreign capital.
As the counterpart to persistent U.S. cur-
rent account deficits throughout the
1980s, foreigners continued to acquire fi-
nancial claims on the United States. By
1989, foreign assets in our nation ex-
ceeded U.S. assets abroad, making Amer-
ica a debtor country. At the end of 1992,
the last year for which data are available,
U.S. debts equaled $612 billion — ap-
proximately 10 percent of our GDP.
• Saving and Investment Patterns
Economists often focus on the current ac-
count as a measure of the overall balance
of payments because it and the associated
foreign capital inflows draw attention to
saving and investment patterns. The
value of any country's production (its
GDP) exactly equals both its national in-
come and the value of its consumption,
investment, government spending, and
net exports of goods and services. A na-
tion whose consumption, investment, and
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NOTE: 1993 data are preliminary. The statistical
discrepancy is treated as unrecorded capital flows.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce.
government spending exceed its pro-
duction at any time necessarily runs a
current account deficit. It essentially
satisfies its excess demand for current
world output through imports.
From the perspective of income, a na-
tion with a current account deficit is
spending on goods and services in ex-
cess of its national income. Conse-
quently, its gross domestic saving (pri-
vate and governmental) falls short of
that necessary to finance its gross do-
mestic investment. Since the early
1980s, private saving in the United
States has been insufficient to finance
both private investment and the budget
deficit of the total government (federal,
state, and local). The inflow of foreign
capital associated with the current ac-
count deficit has served to bridge the
gap between gross domestic saving and
gross domestic investment (see figure
1). In Japan, on the other hand, private
saving and the government budget sur-
plus have exceeded that necessary to
finance its domestic investments. Its ex-
cess savings spill out into world finan-
cial markets as Japan runs a current ac-
count surplus and a capital account
deficit, or capital outflow.
Millions of individuals, both here and
abroad, independently make the sav-
ing, investment, and trade decisions un-
derlying these economic identities.
Any tendency for saving, investment,
the current account position, and capi-
tal flows not to balance brings about
changes in real interest rates and ex-
change rates that pull them back into
line. If, for example, international trade
and capital flows did not occur, any
propensity for U.S. saving to fall below
U.S. investment would cause a rise in
real interest rates here. Increasing inter-
est rates would encourage private sav-
ing and discourage investment and
would continue until equilibrium be-
tween the two was restored. Similarly,
in an economy open to trade and capi-
tal flows, exchange-rate adjustments
offset any tendency for current account
transactions not to equal capital ac-
count transactions.
In the absence of international trade and
capital flows between the United States
and Japan, higher interest rates would
prevail here and lower rates there. Conse-
quently, our balance of payments pattern
benefits both countries: Americans enjoy
more investment at lower interest rates,
while the Japanese profit from greater
savings at higher rates. The persistent cur-
rent account imbalance between the two
countries has served to channel Japanese
savings (via world financial markets) into
the United States.
• Divergent Saving Patterns
Current account developments in both
Japan and the United States since 1991,
which have heightened recent trade ten-
sions, largely seem to reflect a faster pace
of economic recovery here than in Japan.
In the United States, investment spending
has risen faster than national saving as the
recovery has gained momentum; in Japan,
however, investment spending has fallen
with economic activity in general, while
national saving has remained relatively
flat. These divergent cyclical patterns are
likely to reverse themselves when eco-
nomic growth rates between the two coun-
tries resume a more typical pattern.
Although recent cyclical developments
have produced marked effects on the
U.S. and Japanese current accounts,
substantial imbalances have persisted
in both countries since the early 1980s.
Economists generally offer two struc-
tural explanations for this. One fo-
cuses on demographic patterns, which
are likely to adjust only slowly in the
future. Japan's population is older rela-
tive to most other industrial countries
and in the past has acquired assets to fi-
nance its eventual retirement.
3 The
Japanese tend to start saving when rela-
tively young and continue to do so for
a comparatively longer time. More-
over, older generations in Japan, in-
stead of completely consuming their
lifetime savings in their old age, have
tended to leave large bequests.
4
The other structural factor affecting the
trade balances is policy related. Many
economists believe that differences in
the U.S. and Japanese government
budget balances explain the saving and
investment gaps in both countries.
Since 1983, Japan has shifted its gov-
ernment budget balance from a deficit
to a surplus; all else equal, this will in-
crease overall gross domestic saving.
Over this same period, the U.S. budget
deficit has remained large, tending to
subtract from gross domestic saving.
• Fiscal Policy and Saving
The possible connection between fiscal
balances and gross domestic saving has
led many Americans to criticize Japan
for running a budget surplus and to en-
courage the nation to adopt an expan-
sionary fiscal policy. (Similar critiques
of the role played by the U.S. budget
deficit seem less frequent.) But the rela-
tionship between fiscal policies and the
trade account is more complex than the
twin surplus/twin deficit hypothesis
often allows. It depends on differences
between public and private consump-
tion patterns and on how government
policies affect saving decisions.
To examine the influence of fiscal poli-
cies, assume that domestic saving equals
investment in all countries (no current ac-
count imbalances) and consider increases
in government spending financed by a
rise in lump-sum government taxes.
This balanced-budget increase in govern-
ment spending transfers purchasing
power from the private sector to the gov-
ernment sector. How it affects overall
economic activity depends on whether
changes in government spending are tem-
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NOTE: Savings gap equals gross domestic savings (private plus government surpluses) less gross domestic
investment.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and International Monetary Fund.
Individuals, by saving part of their current
income or by borrowing against future
earnings, try to avoid abrupt changes in
consumption patterns over time. Conse-
quently, when tax burdens rise unexpect-
edly, they reduce both current consump-
tion and saving (future consumption).
When the government's fiscal package is
temporary, the net effect is likely to be
greater demands (public plus private) on
current output, reduced saving, and, there-
fore, a trade deficit. Rising imports and
falling exports (a current account deficit)
would satisfy the temporarily increased
demand for output, while foreign capital
inflows (a capital account surplus) would
bridge the gap between lower gross do-
mestic saving and investment. But this
effect depends strictly on the temporary
nature of government spending. Perma-
nent government programs might not im-
pact saving, because they involve a per-
manent transfer of resources from the
private to the public sector, which con-
sumers cannot offset by shifting con-
sumption from the future to the present.
The analysis above is simple and skirts
many issues; it does not consider similar
tax distortions or the effects of policies
on investment and production. Never-
theless, it stresses that the key aspect of
fiscal policy with respect to changes in
the current account is not the govern-
ment's budget surplus or deficit itself,
or the general level of spending or tax-
ing. Instead, it emphasizes that the rela-
tionship between fiscal policies and
current account imbalances may be sub-
stantially more complicated than gener-
ally supposed, and directly associated
with private saving incentives.
• Trade Restraints
Various policies, such as tariffs, can al-
ter spending patterns between domestic
and foreign goods, but may also induce
offsetting changes in prices and ex-
change rates that eventually negate
them. Trade restraints (a tariff, for ex-
ample) cause consumers to shift spend-
ing patterns away from the affected im-
ports. This shift immediately creates a
heightened demand for domestic goods
and an excess supply of the foreign
products under the tariff. Prices and
exchange rates, however, will respond
to shifts in demand, making domestic
goods more expensive than foreign
products. The tariff may reduce im-
ports of, say, Japanese goods, but it
will encourage imports of British,
French, and German goods. Other poli-
cies, such as import targets or quotas,
could have similar offsetting price and
exchange-rate effects, which would cre-
ate inefficiencies.
To affect the current account balance,
trade policies must alter saving pat-
terns. Although some types of restraint
may temporarily do so, this result is
not certain. What is sure, however, is
that restraints introduce production and
consumption inefficiencies that lower
the standard of living and that foreign
retaliation could worsen.
• Yen Appreciation
In response to the U.S.-Japanese trade
imbalance, some analysts have called
for a yen appreciation. Exchange rates
do not change on their own, and so
these analysts must specify a policy to
alter them. Although many of the ac-
tions discussed above would affect ex-
change rates, those conducted by cen-
tral banks would seem to have the most
direct impact.
Unfortunately, although monetary pol-
icy can influence a nation's exchange
rate, it cannot permanently alter its
trade balance. To force an apprecia-
tion of the yen relative to the dollar, the
Federal Reserve must increase money
growth in the United States relative to
Japan, but this will also generate infla-
tionary pressures here at home. Most
economists believe that unanticipated
monetary policy changes affect the ex-
change rate prior to domestic prices, so
some temporary benefit is conceivable.
Eventually, however, higher U.S. prices
would offset any competitive advan-
tage that the dollar's depreciation
might have afforded.
• Sustainable, Beneficial, and Proper
While both the United States and Japan
may have legitimate complaints about
the access of specific goods to the
other's markets, the long-term trade im-
balance of each country stems neither
from product restrictions nor from any
competitive advantage. Trade imbal-
ances are merely the international re-
flections of domestic saving and invest-
ment decisions. The United States has
a trade deficit because we save less
than we invest domestically. Japan has
a trade surplus because it saves more
than it invests domestically. The capital
flows that are the counterparts to thetrade balances of each country accom-
modate the gap between saving and in-
vestment both here and in Japan, bene-
fiting the citizens of each nation.
To be sure, the United States cannot in-
definitely acquire international debt
relative to its ability to service that debt
(typically proxied by GDP). Although
our current level of international indebt-
edness is not obviously unsustainable,
at some point the U.S. trade deficit
must shift to a surplus to prevent fur-
ther increases. The process by which
this occurs may embody increased real
U.S. interest rates and a depreciation of
the dollar, which will cause individuals
to reevaluate their spending and saving
plans. But the evidence of the past dec-
ade suggests that the adjustment proc-
ess does not pose an immediate threat
to economic stability.
• Footnotes
1. Because goods and services trade usually
dominates current account developments, I
use the terms current account and trade ac-
count synonymously.
2. Other explanations for the high rate of
Japanese saving include high housing prices,
difficult requirements for mortgages, and the
favorable tax treatment of capital income.
3. For some recent evidence, see Paul R.
Masson, Jeroen Kremers, and Jocelyn Home,
"Net Foreign Assets and International Adjust-
ment: The United States, Japan, and Germany,"
Journal of International Money and Finance,
vol. 13, no. 1 (February 1994), pp. 27-40.
4. See Fumio Hayashi, "Explaining Japan's
Saving: A Review of Recent Literature," Bank
of Japan, Monetary and Economic Studies,
vol. 10, no. 2 (November 1992), pp. 63-78.
5. The effect of a government's budget sur-
plus or deficit on overall saving also depends
on how it influences private saving decisions.
If a government budget deficit, for example,
leads to greater private saving, gross domes-
tic saving may be unaffected.
6. Lump-sum taxes are straightforward as-
sessments on individuals as opposed to being
proportional to income, wages, or spending.
They do not influence saving behavior. While
unrealistic, this assumption lets us focus
solely on the distortionary effects of
balanced-budget spending changes.
7. Gerald H. Anderson and Owen F. Hum-
page discuss the welfare losses associated
with trade policies in "A Basic Analysis of
the New Protectionism," Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, Economic Review, Win-
ter 1981-82, pp. 2-19.
8. Exchange-market intervention that does
not alter money growth can, at best, have
only a temporary effect on the exchange rate.
See Owen F. Humpage, "Central-Bank Inter-
vention: Recent Literature, Continuing Con-
troversy," Federal Reserve Bank of Cleve-
land, Economic Review, vol. 27, no. 2 (1991
Quarter 2), pp. 12-26.
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